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ABSTRACT
Two methodologies used in aircraft system developments are Model-Based Safety Analysis (MBSA), which assesses 
the safety risk associated with design in later stages, and Model-Based Systems Engineering (MBSE), a process 
that creates the domain models to help design a system. With the continuous growing use of both methodologies, 
it is inevitable that they will become linked to improve the design process from many aspects. This review identifies 
and proposes potential links for the integration of MBSA and MBSE by using the V-model of MBSA, thereby resulting 
in more effective design processes and reduced development costs. The paper addresses a general interpretation 
of the topic and supplementary case studies within the industry regarding both methodologies. Some benefits of the 
link between MBSA and MBSE include: utilisation of a wider range of analysis tools, automated communication of 
important definitions, consistency between both ends, and a potential improvement in confidence regarding design. 
As this is a preliminary proposal regarding the best approach for using MBSA in combination with MBSE, further 
research should be performed into the areas of formalized language, defining systems requirements for the usage of 
this approach, and relationships with the existing regulations and compliance needs. 
Deux méthodes utilisées dans le développement des avions sont l’Analyse de sécurité basée sur des modèles 
(ASBM), qui évalue les risques de sécurité associés avec la conceptualisation d’étapes antérieures, et l’Ingénierie 
des systèmes basée sur des modèles (ISBM), un processus qui crée des modèles de domaine pour concevoir 
un système.Avec l’utilisation croissante des deux méthodes, il est inévitable qu’elles seront liées pour améliorer le 
processus de conceptualisation de plusieurs aspects. Cette revue identifie et propose des liens potentiels qui pourraient 
intégrer l’ASBM et l’ISBM, en utilisant le model-V de MBSA, résultant ainsi en des processus de conceptualisation 
plus efficaces et des coûts de développement réduits. L’article adresse une interprétation générale du sujet et des 
études de cas supplémentaires dans l’industrie qui concernent les deux méthodes de développement. Certains des 
avantages du lien entre ASBM et ISBM incluent: l’utilisation d’une grande gamme d’outils d’analyse, la communication 
automatisée de définitions importantes de conceptualisation, la cohérence entre les deux extrémités, et une confiance 
améliorée dans la conceptualisation. Comme ceci est une proposition préliminaire concernant la meilleure approche 
pour combiner l’ASBM et l’ISBM, de plus amples recherches devraient être menées dans les domaines du langage 
formel, les exigences des systèmes pour utiliser cette approche, les relations avec les règlements actuels et les 
exigences pour la conformité.
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INTRODUCTION 
Difference between Model-Based Safety Analysis & 
Model-Based Systems Engineering
Since its development, Model-Based Safety Analysis 
(MBSA) has been highly revered by both academia 
and industry (Lisagor et al., 2011). It is an approach 
where system and safety engineers share a common 
system model to create/produce automated, or 
semi-automated, support for system safety analysis 
(Joshi et al., 2016). Many MBSA methods have been 
gradually adopted by the industry and regulators 
have found the use of these methods advantageous 
(Lisagor et al., 2011). In addition, the existence of 
multiple safety analysis techniques such as Fault 
Tree Analysis (FTA) and Functional Hazard Analysis 
(FHA) allows for better safety analysis (Joshi et 
al., 2013). Since different safety engineers perform 
analysis differently, it is important to have a formal 
model of the system under development. The goal of 
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MBSA is to provide a more precise model of system 
behaviour, to automate parts of the process, reduce 
the associated costs, and improve the quality of the 
safety analysis process (Joshi et al., 2016). 
Model-Based Systems Engineering (MBSE) focuses 
on creating and using models to exchange information 
(Hart, 2015). For example, instead of relying on text 
to describe the impact of design changes, models 
are used to show the impacts visually (Hart, 2015). It 
is broader in scope since it deals with the designing 
process of a system such as functional allocation, 
system architecture, and performance analysis (Hart, 
2015). MBSE is the formalized application of modeling 
to support system development activities from the 
conceptual design stage to the subsequent stages 
of the life cycle (Lind et al., 2011). This methodology 
formalizes the practice of system development by 
using models (Hart, 2015). It is broad in scope and 
resulting in improvements within many areas. Quality 
and productivity increases, while risks are lowered, 
resulting in a marked reduction in rework and cost 
overruns (Mhenni et al., 2013). MBSE uses a data rich 
environment where documents are moved towards 
programming and digital models (Hart, 2015). This 
shift enables easier communication and understanding 
of design change impacts. It is a prime example of 
a design process moving from a document-centric 
technique towards a model-centric one (Hart, 2015). 
The MBSA method involving design is rather 
established and future work to improve it may have 
little merit (Lisagor et al., 2011). This has led to 
researches shifting in the direction of incorporating 
automated safety analysis with SysML, a language 
used in MBSE. 
Research Objective & Goals
The goal of this project is to propose a way to integrate 
MBSA and MBSE system design methodologies. In 
order to achieve this goal, the following aspects will 
be examined:
• Understanding the procedure and processes 
related to MBSA, identifying the scope of its 
applications, and examining the flexibility of the 
methodology to enable the integration of other 
methodologies.
• Investigating how SysML is used with the MBSE 
system design process, understanding how the 
steps are streamlined, and identifying areas within 
safety analysis to which definitions and functions 
can be added to relate safety assessments of the 
system within MBSE.
• Describing the feasibility of incorporating MBSA 
with MBSE at earlier stages. Through five 
different article reviews, analyze the approach 
of different proposed possibilities of integrating 
safety analysis with MBSE methodology and 
describe the next steps. 
Hypothesis & Questions
The questions explored in this literature review 
include identifying the similarities and differences 
between the two methodologies, MBSA and MBSE. 
This involves identifying and providing suggestions to 
current challenges to the hypothesis, proposing future 
research, and analyzing the multitude of factors that 
will affect the proposal. 
We propose: the most effective and efficient 
combination of MBSA and MBSE, two methodologies 
used in the development lifecycle of a system, is to 
implement safety analysis at the earlier stages of the 
design process using the V model. This allows for 
cross-checking and ensures that individual parts of 
the system are adequately designed.
RATIONALE
It is outlined above that with the development of a 
product, or the design of a new system, safety analysis 
is crucial because of the relationship that it has with 
the users of the system and society. We propose that 
these results may be obtained by investigating the 
existing methodologies that are in use and to improve 
both the efficiency and the effectiveness of the process. 
The main point of interest is to identify and create a 
link between MBSA and MBSE because the current 
practice in aerospace industry’s system safety and 
development assurance follows the complete system 
development lifecycle. This starts at the conceptual 
level. Incorporating MBSA at this level could provide a 
sturdier system, especially in terms of safety analysis 
for the design process (Joshi et al., 2016). The focus 
of this review will be on identifying the feasibility of this 
proposal. 
It is important to consider that both methodologies 
are heavily technical-based. Many interdisciplinary 
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engineers may have received training for it and would 
thus be understood across the board. However, it is 
important to note that some engineers do struggle with 
these methodologies. Nevertheless, the incorporation 
of these methods would be advantageous, leading 
to better communication because the models will 
be consistently defined using formal language. 
Information exchange will be easier because MBSE 
eliminates the need for most textual documents 
and reduces the time associated with having to 
generate them (Hart, 2015). Both systems will work 
with a certain aspect with regards to the design and 
certification processes, creating a single integrated 
methodology that would increase efficiency within 
the overall process (Hart, 2015). It is analogous to 
one-stop shopping in comparison to having to make 
many stops. This research is focused on finding a 
way to improve the current systems design practices 
by having new approaches in regards to combining 
the use and effects of established methodologies. 
LINKING SAFETY ANALYSIS AND SysML 
AS A TOOL FOR THE HAZARD ANALYSIS 
PROFILE
In a paper written by Muller et al., an approach to link 
Safety Analysis and SysML modeling in early stages 
of system design is presented and validated (Muller et 
al., 2016). The paper outlined the three phases of the 
procedure and included a sample industrial study with 
a coffee maker to support the result of their studies 
(Muller et al., 2016). The approach was developed 
to help with the stricter safety regulations, increasing 
complexity of the systems, and shorter development 
cycles (Muller et al., 2016). It is possible to infer that 
the proposed procedure results in the consideration 
of safety aspects experiencing an inevitable shift 
towards the earlier stages of a design process. The 
authors proposed that a common SysML model at 
an earlier stage in system design can be used to 
simultaneously model the system and conduct a 
functional hazard analysis (Muller et al., 2016). With 
regards to MBSE, a combination of functional and 
component architecture: a new “Hazard Analysis” 
profile was developed (Muller et al., 2016). 
Three main phases existed in the creation of the 
new “Hazard Analysis” profile. Phase one involves 
identifying the requirements, use cases and misuse 
cases (Muller et al., 2016). Use cases are the list of 
actions between a role and the system to achieve a 
goal while misuse cases are the process of executing 
a malicious act or abuse towards the system.  In this 
phase, specifications for requirements, use cases, 
and misuse cases are identified (Roth, 2016). The 
required parameters for the safety analysis would 
be set, and ideally, it would be more efficient and 
accurate to have defined criteria for comparison 
within the process (Muller et al., 2016). The second 
phase works with functional architecture, utilizing 
a dynamic perspective (Roth, 2016). In between 
the establishment of functional structures, safety 
analysis, risk analysis, and risk assessment functions 
are incorporated (Muller et al., 2016). At the same 
time, the causes and risks of identified hazards are 
analyzed (Muller et al., 2016). Thus, this process is 
efficient, logical, and covers many aspects that need 
to be considered for a safety analysis that complies 
with the stricter safety testing regulations. The last 
phase, where the system structure is established, is 
associated with system architecture (Roth, 2016). The 
three phases are all done under another component 
hazard analysis and risk assessment (Roth, 2016). 
One significant addition is defining safety measures 
to mitigate or prevent the effects of failures, which 
was done to increase reliability (Muller et al., 2016). It 
is a logical flow of starting from the smaller aspects of 
the whole system, and then gradually moving towards 
the bigger picture to see the whole system.
With the three-step process, it is possible to see 
the precision present in the early stages of the 
development process. With a basic safety analysis, 
the majority of requirements should be satisfied 
unless there are more prevalent and specific safety 
factors that deserve more attention (Muller et al., 
2016). It focuses on attention to detail and ensures 
that the design does not possess a conceptual or 
fundamental error. The parameters and variables 
can also be set accordingly so that more extensive 
applications in the real world are feasible. The main 
language used for this purpose is SysML, a common, 
open-source language used in systems engineering. 
SysML offers a broad range of support the various 
functions within systems design. Furthermore, 
qualitative and inductive methods are considered 
for the safety analysis. In a sense, the focus can 
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be shifted towards quality and safety even at an 
conceptual stage, where it is possible to have more 
ideas and thus more alternative actions to achieve 
the same goal.
This article relates back to the hypothesis of 
incorporating a safety assessment at the beginning 
of the MBSE process by providing proof that it is a 
feasible task that will satisfy the necessary safety 
regulations at an early stage of system development. 
More investigation with regards to the safety aspect 
is expected at later stages, but this paper addresses 
the cause and effect chain. To summarize, the three-
phase method proposed by Muller et al. does indeed 
relate to the possibility of incorporating Model Based 
Safety Analysis into MBSE as a system which aids 
in strengthening the reliability and safety at earlier 
stages of the development process. 
SAFETY ANALYSIS INTEGRATION IN A 
SysML-BASED COMPLEX SYSTEM DESIGN 
PROCESS
In the article by Mhenni et al., the main goal is to 
incorporate safety analysis in MBSE (Mhenni et al., 
2013). Similar to the previous paper, the emphasis 
is on incorporating safety analysis in earlier stages 
of MBSE. The authors used qualitative analysis in 
functional and behavioural safety analysis and a 
formal verification method to strengthen the process 
(Mhenni et al., 2013). This is illustrated with a sample 
industrial study using a real-life avionic wheel brake 
system (Mhenni et al., 2013). 
It is known that MBSE analysis via SysML aims to 
facilitate communication among the interdisciplinary 
engineers by using a consistent and well-defined 
language (Mhenni et al., 2013). Incorporating a safety 
analysis component in the early stages will have its 
merit as it can detect problems early on (Mhenni 
et al., 2013). In addition, because there exists 
a standard language across the board, different 
engineers working with MBSE would understand it 
in a consistent manner (Mhenni et al., 2013). Since 
the training for MBSE is not too complicated, it is 
worth the time and the effort to use this method, and 
improve consistency across a company. In addition, 
consistency with vendors can also exist. Traditionally, 
safety analysis is performed at a later stage, and 
there is no direct influence in the system design 
(Mhenni et al., 2013). Using safety analysis alongside 
the system design process can achieve “design safe” 
because problems are identified as soon as possible, 
and at that time, only minor changes need to be made 
in comparison to major changes needed at the end or 
later stages (Mhenni et al., 2013). It is typically more 
feasible and cost effective to be making changes in 
the earlier stages of a product development. Not only 
are there few costs associated with the alternatives, 
there can be more alternative designs that will satisfy 
the goal. While as a product becomes more finalized 
in its design, the possible alternatives will be very 
limited in what can be changes, as well, the cost 
associated with the changes will go up (Figure 1, 
below). Implementing a preliminary safety analysis 
at the beginning of the design process will allow for 
more changes to be made, and at a fraction of what 
cost it would be in the later phases.
Producon Stage 
Lowest number of alternave 
designs 
Highest cost to implement the 
alternaves 
Development Stage 
Some alternave designs are 
possible  
Some costs are associated 
with alternaves 
Requirements Stage 
Highest number of alternave 
designs 
Lowest cost to implement the 
alternaves 
Figure 1: Number of design alternatives vs. Cost of 
change
In the requirements phase, more design alternatives exist, 
and the cost of change is lower. While in the deployment 
phase, it is opposite. (adapted from Bias & Mayhew, 1994)
The industrial case study used by Mhenni et al., 
provided proof that the proposed methodologies 
for safety analysis meet the standards and that it is 
logical and feasible to incorporate them at an earlier 
stage. The model can be seen defining a normal state 
of operations, activating alternatives when needed, 
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using emergency mode if alternatives fail, and giving 
a final failure notification if everything fails (Mhenni 
et al., 2013). The three-step checking provides a 
double-checking method. It can be inferred that this 
will improve the overall accuracy, precision, and 
reliability of the process. The method described 
by Mhenni et al. can be summarized as defining 
requirements, detecting errors, analyzing errors, 
creating risk mitigation plans, and having a formal 
verification at the end (Mhenni et al., 2013). However, 
this process can be considered time-consuming 
in comparison to directly putting the necessary 
assessments in between the functional definition and 
system architecture.   
Finally, this paper provides support to the hypothesis 
that extensive method for the safety analysis to can 
exist, and it allows for a wider analysis coverage 
for people working within the development process 
(Mhenni et al., 2013). In summary, the safety analysis 
incorporated will allow for a more robust assessment, 
and traceability between system and safety models 
assuring a coherent procedure, and lowering the 
chances of inaccurate results. 
MODEL-BASED SYSTEM SAFETY ASSESSMENT 
OF AIRCRAFT POWER PLANT
In a study conducted by Li et al., the team uses a new 
approach with MBSA for complex systems such as 
the power plant system of an aircraft (Li et al., 2013). 
The process of MBSA is studied by linking function 
modeling with formal language and fault propagation 
using Altarica (Li et al., 2013). This is an attempt at 
unifying the process of system safety assessment 
and system development. The paper uses a case 
study done with an aircraft power plant (engine) (Li 
et al., 2013). 
In addition to the traditional V process of safety 
assessment, Functional Hazard Analysis (FHA) 
is implemented at the beginning to support 
automated safety analysis along with an incremental 
development of the system model (Li et al., 2013). At 
the beginning, FHA was used to initiate the system 
development process by defining requirements, 
architecture, and design (Li et al., 2013). After the 
design stage, it uses a Failure Mode and Effects 
Analysis (FMEA) and Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) to 
verify that the system satisfied the safety objectives 
set out in earlier stages of the design process (Li et 
al., 2013). Another significant component to note is 
that in later stages, the system is changed, and the 
team implemented an automated reply of the safety 
in order to cross-check aircraft integration and system 
integration. It automates the safety analysis by using 
tools and formal language from multidisciplinary 
methodologies (Li et al., 2013). Formal modelling 
and safety synthesis were used to summarize the 
key techniques (Li et al., 2013). Altarica supports the 
automated modeling and analysis of systems with a 
graphical interfaced language base to design models 
and analyze them (Li et al., 2013). 
The paper incorporates the effective parts of the V 
process for MBSA and finds that new additions are 
added to it to improve the overall safety analysis 
and certification process. One item of note, is the 
incorporation of multiple stages. For example, a new 
pathway to be opened up if initial analysis finds a 
fault, which will start to generate a solution, or a rerun 
of the safety analysis. If it still displays that faults are 
present, then a different priority can be placed on 
it to identify new solutions, or it can be highlighted 
for urgent attention. The constant linkage back to 
the system function, system architecture, and the 
requirements definition should be added to provide a 
safety net for the safety analysis procedure. 
Overall the paper concludes that the new V model 
that includes FHAs in the beginning and end of the 
design process allows automation and cross-checks 
of safety analysis (Li et al., 2013). This enables 
efficiency, as well as verification that the implemented 
system satisfies the safety requirements and can 
support the certification process (Li et al., 2013). 
MODELICA BASED TOOLS AND MODEL 
BASED SYSTEMS ENGINEERING FOR 
AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS
The paper written by Lind et al. explores how MBSE 
fits for aircraft systems, as well as the effort required to 
migrate models from other simulation tools to Dymola 
(Lind et al., 2011). The paper highlights the models 
and tools as well as experiences with their usage in 
an industrial context (Lind et al., 2011). The authors 
view MBSE as a system that allows the collection of 
information to create an executable description, a 
model (Lind et al., 2011). This encourages the flow 
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of information and an in depth understanding of a 
complex system (Lind et al., 2011). 
Dymola is a tool that supports the mandatory aspects 
of tools integration. The process starts with physical 
equipment, and then the software specification 
(Lind et al., 2011). The simulation loop is closed to 
allow engineers to perform tasks that they are most 
comfortable with (Lind et al., 2011). At this stage, 
safety assessments of the system give performance 
evaluations. Large scale simulators are then used with 
real time performance analysis to test systems as well 
as ground and flight tests (Lind et al., 2011). Lastly, 
data feedback is established. Many factors should be 
considered while using a modelling process including: 
configuration handling, binding time and methods of 
integration (Lind et al., 2011). While Dymola may 
prove to be enough for smaller subsystems in aircraft, 
but a more specialized framework is still needed (Lind 
et al., 2011). 
This article provides an understanding of how MBSE 
works with aircrafts, and explores the safety analysis 
at a later stage: after the simulation but before large 
scale simulators. This proves that there is a need to 
incorporate the safety analysis at an early stage, not 
just when the engineers are splitting up to work with 
what they are comfortable with. In addition, very little 
presence of safety analysis can be seen in MBSE, 
so it may prove to be valuable if it is added in any 
way so that the safety analysis is as sophisticated as 
the simulation and testing. In addition, it will be able 
to generate a large database with the feedback data 
(test data, simulation data, fault tree analysis data, 
etc.) to allow for interdisciplinary use amongst the 
engineers and technicians.
REVIEW OF THE DISCIPLINE OF MODEL-
BASED SAFETY ASSESSMENT AND ITS 
CHALLENGES 
Lisagor et al. explores the model provenance and 
engineering semantics of component interfaces of 
Model-Based Safety Assessment (Lisagor et al., 
2011). All MBSA techniques seek a tighter integration 
of safety assessment of the models designed (Lisagor 
et al., 2011). A model is dedicated to the specific 
process and MBSA encompasses a large number 
of fundamentally different techniques that create 
limitations and challenges (Lisagor et al., 2011). The 
existing approach allows for techniques to be used 
and grouped with those features (Lisagor et al., 
2011). Additionally, the paper indicates that the cross-
disciplinary nature of MBSA should be stressed, and 
it is possible to combine it with elements of System 
Safety Engineering and Computer Science disciplines. 
Various techniques were explored in this paper, and 
the authors believed that the current model of MBSA 
is a relatively developed methodology and that no 
future additions would be able to have a significant 
impact (Lisagor et al., 2011). 
Lisagor et al. concludes that further researches for 
solely MBSA will not yield substantial impacts. This 
opens the possibility of taking a new direction with the 
research. For example, MBSA could be combined with 
another methodology. Overall, the paper does indicate 
that the current technologies used are sufficient, and 
new researches may or may not be needed. 
DISCUSSION
An improved V process for MBSA (Figure 2), starts at 
the requirement phase and goes through many stages 
of safety analysis before the product is designed. 
While after the design, more safety analysis and cross-
checks are implemented and compared with the initial 
standards. FHA for aircraft and system are included 
Safety functions would be similar to those 
proposed by Muller et al. with three statuses 
to be included during the design process 
Figure 2: The Improved V Process
Many cross-checking between requirements and post-
design analysis are implemented. (Adapted from Li et al. 
2013)
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before the actual design process (Li et al., 2013). 
The use of MBSE during the design process would 
be useful and safety functions could be integrated 
between the different functional, operational, and 
architecture models. Like the previously proposed 
method, a safety analysis can be done on individual 
functions, as each step of the design is analyzed 
with an FHA and risk assessment (Muller et al., 
2016). Most importantly, double checking should be 
implemented. Three different levels should exist in 
which the function can be marked as safe, flagged, 
or revision needed (Figure 3). After it is flagged, an 
investigation should be conducted with a formalized 
fault tree model and FMEA. The emphasis should be 
on consistency as there is the demand for precision 
and uniformity throughout the process.
Safety 
Analysis 
Funcon 
Safe 
Flagged 
Revisions 
Needed 
Figure 3: Safety Analysis Function and its Parts
The three statuses within the safety analysis function used 
in the design process.
MBSE is very valuable in this regard since it moves 
away from the document-based system to a data-
rich environment (Hart, 2015). Lastly, the findings in 
the previous stages should be continuously updated 
so that it allows for easy access in the future design 
stages. In addition, data on the severity and the 
probability of occurrence should be assessed and 
reported. The system architecture should also be 
evaluated this way, where separate aspects of the 
system are analyzed separately before combining 
them for the final safety analysis. The post-design 
safety assessment should match that which was 
conducted at the beginning, communication between 
the two sides should be maintained before the design 
process is completed and certification given. The 
entire cause and effect chain in specific areas of 
design should be covered by the proposed method. 
With the proposed outlines for the combination of 
MBSA and MBSE, areas of research would be as 
follows: unifying both methods to form a common 
formal language that develops the components of the 
safety analysis and the model. SysML can be used 
as a common basis for the program for the necessary 
functions or commands (Roth, 2016). With safety 
definitions, CAD models could be included to identify 
the correct pathway. Having a solid language base 
with the system will be beneficial and will support 
the ease of communication between the technicians 
and engineers, as well as the fluidity of the designing 
process. A specific area of research focus should be to 
implement uniform definitions and functions to ensure 
consistency in troubleshooting aspects. Additionally, 
researchers should consider the requirements for the 
design to have them fit this design process. Factors 
such as the complexity of the system, the needs of 
the system, and the timeline of the design should be 
considered when further developing the proposed 
system. Furthermore, the new process should be 
in compliance with the current regulations, but also 
flexible, to accommodate future regulatory changes. 
CONCLUSION
This paper analyzed five independently-completed 
research papers on the system design methodologies, 
MBSA and MBSE, to highlight the process of 
designing and assessing the safety of a system. In 
these articles, it was noted that there is merit in trying 
to find a common ground to connect the two methods 
because it allows for simultaneous design, modelling, 
and hazard analysis within a common model (Lisagor 
et al., 2011). At the same time, it can combine the 
safety analysis procedure and a specific system 
design together to detect problems early (Muller et 
al., 2016). If the quality of analysis is sufficient for 
early deign stages; it will improve productivity in 
later stages with regards to safety testing and the 
engineer’s confidence in the design. 
In relation to the original hypothesis, the research 
papers consulted support the idea that incorporating 
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safety assessment in the earlier stages of design 
is beneficial. In addition, it is unlikely that further 
exclusive research on MBSA will yield a significant 
improvement in the field. This prompts the need to 
combine existing methods of MBSA with another 
direction of research so that the results can be seen 
more clearly. Moreover, the research suggests that 
the efficiency of the design process will be increased 
when the safety assessments are conducted at the 
beginning as well as at the end of system design. 
Lastly, an extensive method with wider coverage 
can be developed by following the proposed idea 
of combining MBSA and MBSE. Advantages of this 
include using a standardized fault analysis and being 
in a data-rich environment. 
Additional Developments and Future Works
Currently, there are many proposed developments 
in the integration of MBSA and MBSE. To truly 
implement changes in the future of product design, 
the relationship with the regulatory aspect should be 
considered. In Canada, Transport Canada’s National 
Aircraft Certification outlines and regulates standards 
for aeronautical products designed and operated in 
Canada. It works in highly technical fields such as the 
design and testing of structures, electrical systems, 
and power plants. The certification process in Canada 
is governed by Part V, section 21 of the Canadian 
Aviation Regulations (Government of Canada, 2016). 
Some aspects to consider could be that the timelines 
for the certification and testing process versus how 
fast the regulations change. Another thing to note 
would be the question of will the proposed process 
even be regulated? Canada exercises commonality 
and harmonization as much as possible. Therefore, 
if the process is compliant within Canada, it would 
likely follow the majority of standards outlined in 
international regulations. 
ABBREVIATIONS
Abbreviation Full Form
MBSA Model-Based Safety Analysis
MBSE Model-Based System Engineering
SysML Systems Modeling Language
FTA Fault Tree Analysis
FHA Fault Hazard Analysis
FMEA Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
CAD  Computer-Aided Design
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